This article explores the contrasting diplomacies of the United States and the European Union, drawing attention to the characteristics of the US as a 'warrior state' and the EU as a form of 'trading state' in which a complex and hybrid form of diplomacy is produced through the interplay of European and national foreign policies. It then pursues the argument that the interplay of US and EU diplomacies has generated an evolving EU-US diplomatic system, which in itself is hybrid and multi-dimensional. The article explores the context within which the EU-US diplomatic system has evolved and is evolving, and proposes three key patterns of diplomatic relations as the core of the system: 'special relationships' reflecting specific ties between the US and key EU Member States, 'transatlantic governance' reflecting the growth of transatlantic transactions and demands for their management, and 'world order diplomacy' centred on global governance institutions, patterns of intervention and crisis management.
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Introduction
This article aims to explore the ramifications of two coexisting processes, which arguably reflect 'two worlds of diplomacy' represented by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). On the one hand, it examines the challenges posed by US foreign policy and diplomacy, and tries to identify some of the constants around which successive US Administrations have fluctuated. In doing so, it makes the argument that US diplomacy is pervaded by the character of the US as a 'warrior state', which places a strong emphasis on sovereignty, state action and the use of force.
In contrast, European diplomacy represents a distinctive hybrid. On the one hand, there is European diplomacy in its broad sense, encompassing the diplomacy of European countries, among them some significant if secondary 'powers', as well as patterns of collective European action. On the other hand, there is the diplomacy accompanying 'European foreign policy', centred on the European Union and reflecting the progress and limitation of the European integration project. The argument here is that both of these versions of 'European diplomacy' need to be taken into account, and that the hybrid characteristics of 'European diplomacy' are precisely the result of the interaction between these two strands of development.
The article argues that these coexisting and intersecting characteristics of US and European diplomacy have given rise to a hybrid 'EU-US diplomatic system' with a number of key characteristics and patterns of behaviour. This system is explored in more depth in terms of its impact during the George W Bush and Obama Presidencies, and in terms of developments in the EU after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
The article concludes by discussing the possibility that a new EU diplomatic system might transform the EU-US diplomatic system, and by linking the development of the EU-US system to broader developments in the field of diplomacy.
The United States and Europe: Two Worlds of Diplomacy?
A summary version of US diplomacy would certainly start from the central importance of strategy, and of 'grand strategy' in particular. US foreign policy discourse is characterised by attention to the building of a strategic framework in which vital interests are identified and strategic choices made in order to facilitate the pursuit of those interests. There is a long tradition in debates about US foreign policy of reference to the demands of grand strategy, and of the key significance surrounding the procurement of capabilities -especially military capabilities -with which to pursue it 1 . Not surprisingly, these debates lead to a focus on material capabilities and what has been termed 'hard power' in the pursuit of US foreign policy ambitions; indeed, it has also been argued by Joseph Nye and others that the focus on 'hard power' has led to a squandering of US 'soft power' resources, and that the need to restore balance in US policy demands a focus on 'smart power' within the world arena, its diplomacy is also likely to rest upon assumptions of precedence and of the capacity to challenge the sovereignty of other, lesser powers. Diplomacy in such a context is also likely to be directed towards (or result in) the cultivation of client relationships and of dependencies, whether formal or informal. Given the presence of dominant power, it is also probable that diplomacy will be strongly results-orientated, with a focus on bargaining against a background of superior resources -although such a diplomacy does not guarantee the desired results, given the capacity of lesser powers to exploit specific contexts or to act collectively against the dominant power 4 .
The presence of dominant power also implies that the calculus of diplomacy is likely to be affected; in other words, whether or not -or how much -to use diplomatic methods becomes a matter of political choice, rather than a necessity reflecting the need to negotiate even with one's sworn enemies. No matter what the fluctuations in style and specific content, it might be argued, US foreign policy and diplomacy is consistently that of a 'warrior state'. It does not matter which President or Administration is at issue -the features will be there, modified by circumstances or by issues but never absent. Thus, diplomacy will be strongly conditioned by the evolution of the global balance of power (as understood in Washington), and will also respond 4 .
A European-American Diplomatic System?
The US is the most significant 'other' of the European integration process, but at the same time, it is also part of a collective 'we' expressed in the broader structures and processes of transatlantic relations and in terms of the increasing economic integration of the North Atlantic area
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. If there is an emergent European-American diplomatic system centred on EU-US relations, such a system will express the differences of diplomatic cultures and practices outlined in the earlier parts of the article, as well as the hybridity and complexity of the emerging EU diplomatic system itself. As a result, in contrast to the stark dichotomy suggested earlier between the diplomacy of the US as a 'warrior state' and the EU as a 'trading state', the EU-US diplomatic system is itself likely to be a hybrid and a challenge to assumptions of difference on both sides of the Atlantic. foreign offices. The processes are thus sustained by networks of cooperation in which diplomats may be joined by 'domestic' officials and by nongovernmental actors, producing a form of 'intense transgovernmentalism' with added transnational elements at the transatlantic level. Their growth provides compelling evidence of the ways in which a hybrid diplomatic system already exists between the EU and the US -and it also plays to the strengths of the EU by focusing on political economy and regulatory politics rather than the 'high politics' of conventional security policies.
The third element of the EU-US diplomatic system that should be explored here is 'world order diplomacy'. This is an area in which 'European diplomacy' has received decidedly mixed notices, especially in its attempts to exercise diplomatic influence outside its own European backyard; critics have drawn attention to the slowness and deliberative nature of EU foreign policymaking, and to the ways in which European leverage declines dramatically once it moves outside areas in which it might be seen as exercising 'external governance'. This has also been noted by a series of US policy-makers, including those of both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations, and as a result it could be argued that the EU has become progressively marginalized in US diplomacy during the post-Cold War period -even, it must be said, in some regions very close to the EU heartland, in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
A related area of tension and ambiguity in the EU-US diplomatic system, when it comes to matters of world order, centres on the availability and potential use of force. There has developed a strong differentiation between EU policies largely based on conflict prevention (and thus on the predominance of diplomacy and 'civilian' methods) and US policies that contemplate the use of force ab initio (even if force is not actually deployed).
But there is also an element of differentiation within the EU itself, where a number of Member States are more ready and able to contemplate the use of force, and where this readiness is accentuated by the demands of US diplomacy. This opens up the prospect of 'divide and rule' in EU-US diplomacy, either as the result of deliberate US tactics or as a reflection of internal tensions within the EU itself.
Such negative judgements do not, however, reflect the whole picture.
The EU-US diplomatic system in relation to world order issues is not simply a case study in US dominance and European deference or marginalisation. The EU has also, with the development of its capacity for crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction, discovered a capacity for intervention which seems to express a type of 'structural diplomacy' aimed at getting below the skin of actors in regional and other conflicts 19 . In such interventions, the US has often been absent, partly because they have occurred predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa, where US diplomacy has until recently been dormant; where the US has been heavily engaged, as in the Middle East, the EU has found it very difficult to develop either a collective position or an effective structural diplomacy 20 .
As a result of these co-existing areas of ambiguity and tension, the EU-US diplomatic system displays a number of key features. Bilateral 'special relationships' flourish alongside a growing system of transatlantic governance in which governmental and non-governmental actors interact in conditions of complex interdependence, and both are accompanied by a diplomacy of world order in which the EU is increasingly active but is frequently marginalized by considerations of US grand strategy -or marginalizes itself through actual or potential defections by Member States. Often, defection is a reflection of precisely those 'special relationships' that exist elsewhere in the EU-US diplomatic system; it is noticeably more prevalent in areas of global security and 'high politics' than in areas of transatlantic and global governance. The system is thus hybrid, evolving and fluctuating, and reflects short-term changes in political preferences and practices as well as longer-term underlying contrasts between European and US diplomacy.
Euro-American Diplomacy from Bush to Obama
How have the challenges created by the contrasting natures of European and US diplomacy played out in recent policy developments, and how has the hybrid nature of the EU-US diplomatic system shaped diplomatic processes and outcomes? In this part of the article, I argue that the first decade of the twenty-first century displays distinct phases of EU-US diplomacy -centring on successive US Administrations and their foreign policies, but shaped in part by developments within the EU itself -and that each of these phases can be accounted for in terms of the three types of diplomatic focuses identified above: 'special relationships', transatlantic governance and world order. As a result, I argue, each US Administration has posed a specific challenge to European diplomacy and the EU has produced a specific pattern of response.
In terms of the three coexisting strands of EU-US diplomacy outlined earlier in this article, there are important implications to be drawn from the first George W. Bush Administration and its impact on European diplomacy. First, the assertiveness and the peremptory nature of US policy gave renewed salience to 'special relationships'. Some of these were of long standing, the most obvious being that between Britain and the United States; others were relations was on a far more even keel than in the areas of 'high politics' and 'hard security' 23 .
As might be expected from the account of 'special relationships' above, the EU-US diplomacy of world order presented a picture of conflict and tensions during the first George W. Bush Administration. Most obviously, this was felt in relation to the Iraq war and the 'War on Terror'. But there was a crucial difference between the ways in which EU and US diplomacy interacted in the two domains. On Iraq, the Americans could pose a challenge that the Europeans collectively were simply unable to meet, by acting unilaterally, emphasising pre-emption rather than prevention, and calling in the 'special relationships' that were most potent among a number of EU Member States.
In the 'War on Terror', on the other hand, the instruments of conflict were more diverse and less the subject of an effective US monopoly; dealing with terrorism required financial, administrative and other instruments that the Europeans were able to mobilise collectively, and on which EU-US agreement was far more efficient than a series of bilateral diplomatic processes. Even in the area of 'high politics' therefore, the European collectively had something to offer.
At the same time, the Europeans were able to muster collective will in a number of areas of global governance and thus to resist or to by-pass US The reasons for this renewed challenge were four. First, although the new Administration set about building a foreign policy that gave far more prominence to international organisations generally and to multilateralism in many forms, it explicitly demanded that partners in this process should step up to the plate and accept responsibility, rather than simply letting the US take the strain. Second, and related, the Administration based its policies on a form of pragmatic realism that was designed to be adaptable to the specific challenges and opportunities confronting the US; as a result, the key driving factor was interests and opportunities as they presented themselves to
Washington rather than long term or programmatic commitments to specific partners. Third -and again related -the changing structure of the world arena had by 2009 created new challenges to which the US would have to respond; partly these challenges were economic, but partly also they were related to a changing appreciation of the global power structure that had inescapable political and security dimensions. . At the same time, the EU has been unable to respond effectively to the more demanding US requests for assistance in 'world order' issues such as those in Iraq and Afghanistandespite the fact that the voice asking for assistance is one that they wanted in the White House.
There is an obvious conclusion to this phase of the argument: that detailed analysis and evaluation, it might be contended that they not only exposed the underlying differences of diplomatic and 'hard power' capacity between the EU and the US but also demonstrated in sharp form the multifocal nature of the 'EU-US diplomatic system' and the resulting tensions in the EU's emerging diplomacy.
